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In this thesis, I conduct an exploratory study of the relationship between a country's 
freedom and the twitter activity during elections. While there have been many studies 
of Twitter and elections, there has been no previous research conducted to explore the 
relationship between a countries' freedom and how Twitter influences elections in that 
given country. My goal is to identify hypotheses for future work in this area, 
introduce research designs and to shed light on areas of research where there seems to 
be little indication of relationships. I explore this space with automated analysis of the 
tweets' text, election outcomes, freedom ratings for the countries, and sentiment 
analysis. My results show that there seems to be a weak relationship between the 
outcome of an election and the sentiment expressed towards a candidate in tweets and 
that there is no relationship between the freedom in a given country and the sentiment 
expressed towards the incumbent. I found promising initial results regarding the 
relationship among content removed from links during an election and freedom status 
  
of a country, as well as the correlation between how frequently a candidate is 
mentioned and the election outcome. In the discussion, I present research questions in 
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Chapter 1: Purpose and Significance of the Study 
In the past several years, various social media platforms have become widely 
used on a global scale. One particular microblogging platform, Twitter, has emerged 
as a global Internet venue for expressing opinions. The topics discussed on Twitter 
vary, but almost no genre is left unaddressed. Millions of new posts are made daily 
about entertainment, sports news and political news.  
In today’s wired world, politicians have realized the value of utilizing Twitter 
and the cost of ignoring it. In the United States, the 100% of the Senate and 90% of 
the House of Representatives have verified Twitter accounts (Sharp, 2013). Twitter is 
utilized in the campaigning process, to harness support for legislation and to spread 
information.  
Certain political organizations and campaigns even find ways to exploit 
Twitter’s growth in prominence by political astroturphing. These are political 
campaigns disguised as grassroots behavior attempting to spread information 
(Ratkiewicz et. al, 2011). This use of social media shows that campaigns understand 
the importance of the role of social media in influencing opinions and ultimately 
influencing the outcome of an election. In the election process, candidates use social 
media as a means to express their views and harness support. Social media’s success 
in accumulating support is delineated by Barack Obama’s success in harnessing 
grassroots support using social media in his 2008 presidential campaign (Rasmussen 
& Schoen, 2010). 
While the prominence of social media, particularly Twitter, has become 




scale. Even in less democratic systems, where the general public may believe the 
election to be fixed, social media is used by citizens and people to anonymously 
express opinions about incumbents without experiencing the repercussions common 
to dictatorial regimes for expressing opinions freely. Globally, Twitter has played an 
instrumental role in elections and has even contributed to accelerating the pace of 
revolutions that contribute to entire regime changes (Chebib & Sohail, 2011). Egypt’s 
revolution was influenced by social media (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Western 
media dubbed the uprisings in Iran following the announcement of the 2009 election 
results, “The Twitter Revolution” (Grossman, 2009; Schleifer, 2009). In countries 
like Brazil, Venezuela, France, Mexico, South Korea, France and Colombia, 
presidential candidates have “verified” Twitter accounts and use their Twitter pages 
to express their views and campaign. In Russia, political hashtags affect public 
sentiment towards various topics (Alexanyan et. al, 2012). Thus, it is observed that 
social media plays a role in politics in countries all over the world with varying 
political climates.   
The Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that administers 
research and promotes democracy, political freedom and human rights globally 
conducts a study annually that results in the assigned “Freedom Status” of all of the 
countries in the world. The Freedom House assigns a Freedom Status (Free, “not 
free” or “partly free”) to all the countries in the world and assigns ‘political rights’ 
and ‘civil liberties’ scores  (between 1-6, 1 being most free, 6 being least). From this, 
I conduct an exploratory of study nine different countries with varying “freedom 




With social media burgeoning with new information streams and new users, 
researchers can utilize these information streams to discover trends in politics. In this 
thesis, I conduct an exploratory study of the relationship between a country's freedom 
status and the twitter activity during elections. While there have been many studies 
exploring Twitter’s role in elections (Gayo-Avello, 2012; Little, 2012; Livne et. al, 
2011; O’Connor et. al, 2011), there has been no previous study of the relationship 
between a country’s freedom status and the Twitter activity during that election. I 
utilize global Twitter use to compare the relationship between tweets, freedom status 
of a country, and election outcome. Using a combination of network analysis, text 
analysis and metrics from the Freedom House, I explore the trends that emerge 
among nine different countries with different freedom statuses during their respective 














Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 
Much previous research has been conducted on the use of social media during 
elections and the after math of elections. Particularly, much research has been 
conducted on social media use in the countries focused in this study. Below, I discuss 
previous research regarding Twitter use and a few of the countries in this study. 
Furthermore, I outline previous work that has revealed evidence of abuse such as 
astroturphing, spamming and “message dilution“ by political entities. I discuss 
previous work conducted on election prediction with Twitter in the United States, as 
well as criticisms of election prediction using Twitter.  
Social Media Use During Mass Protests 
The last four years have seen an increase of social media use during mass 
protests globally. Egypt’s revolution, one of the uprisings involved in the Arab Spring 
movement, was very closely linked with the widespread use of social media, 
particularly Twitter use. Internet use in the Middle East varies. Based on the Internal 
Telecommunications Union, 24% of Egyptians use the Internet. The Mubarak regime 
cut access to the Internet following the January 25, 2011 protests when widespread 
Twitter use posed a threat to the regime. Despite limited Internet access, Egyptians 
were able to make use of Twitter, as demonstrated by the tweet: “RT @Dima_Khatib: 
Mobiles around Tahrir Square are not working any more. Blocked too. Like Internet 
#egypt #jan25 #cairo”. Tweets like the one above demonstrate that Egyptians view 
Twitter as an important tool in furthering their cause to democracy and freedom 




Similarly, Twitter played an important role in the 2009 Iranian election. 
Kavanaugh et. al (2012) discusses the reasons why Twitter was important in Iran’s 
street protests following the 2009 Iranian elections.  Protestors required immediate 
information in order to avoid clashes with the authorities. The government blocked 
access to Twitter, so the Twitter service was only available either through proxy or 
text message on a mobile phone.  
Different Forms of Censorship Within “Not-Free” Countries 
Previous research outlines the various methods dictatorial regimes employ to 
prevent the access to information. In countries like Egypt and Iran, the government 
outright blocks access to sites like Facebook and Twitter in times of protest. For 
example, Internet traffic dropped abruptly from and to Egypt across 80 Internet 
Service Providers on January 25, 2011.  As a result of this government intervention, 
approximately 97% of Egyptian Internet traffic was lost during this time (Kavanaugh 
et. al, 2012).  
Though Russia shares the same Freedom House classification as Iran and 
Egypt according the 2012 Freedom House Annual Report (2012), authorities in 
Russia employ other methods to stifle Twitter dissent, for instance, through the use of 
hashtags. Hashtags in Twitter are important during any crisis or event. Hashtags have 
become a mechanism for organizing conversations around topics. The government in 
Russia takes advantage of this feature on Twitter to employ a new type of censorship. 
Thomas, Greer and Paxson (2012) define “message dilution”, a process that involves 
automated accounts posting conflicting, irrelevant and incomprehensible content with 




During the most recent 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, 25,860 
fraudulent Twitter accounts “injected” 440,793 tweets into legitimate conversations 
about the election, in an attempt to distract the conversation from the original topic.  
According to the geolocations of the “injected” tweets, the majority of the spam bots 
used to inject tweets were not located in Russia. 39% of the IP addresses from which 
the spam bots tweeted belong to IP blacklists. This study relied on Twitter’s internal 
spam detection algorithm to detect the spam (Thomas et. al, 2012). This work shows 
that even governments in “not free” countries such as Russia understand the 
importance of Twitter as a political tool.  
Astroturphing 
While the previous section discusses “message dilution”, a method employed 
by Russia, a “not free” country, to stifle political dissent, political campaign groups in 
“free” countries also attempt to use Twitter to influence public opinion. In the United 
States, political organizations and campaigns exploit Twitter’s growth in prominence 
by political astroturphing. These are political campaigns disguised as grassroots 
behavior attempting to spread information. Rakiewtz et. al (2012) introduce a new 
system architecture, Truthy, to detect atroturphing and ultimately succeed in 
automatically detecting political memes, a term coined by Stephen Colbert to 
described something some claims to know that is known based on feelings, rather 
than facts (Ratkiewicz et. al, 2012).   
In the most recent Mexican elections, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has 
reportedly also resorted to spam tactics. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 




topics, popular topics discussed on Twitter. These spam bots take advantage of the 
existence of hashtags to make certain words or run-on phrases searchable.  While all 
three dominant political parties utilized spamming in the Mexican presidential 
campaign, a Mexican web developer has created a site listing all of the spam accounts 
used by the PRI. The list of spam bots can be found at this url: 
http://santiesteban.org/adiosbots/en.html. 
 Detecting spam, astroturphing and sybil accounts involved in “message 
dilution” all present the same challenges. Different strategies have been deployed for 
the detection of such abuse on Twitter, such as analyzing the profiles and networks of 
spam accounts, looking at statistical properties of accounts, and detecting spam URLs 
(Thomas et. al, 2012).  
Election Prediction 
Many studies have attempted to predict election outcomes looking at Twitter 
data. A study conducted by O’Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith 
(2010) compares the results of traditional polls with sentiment provided by the text in 
Twitter.  Looking at the text in Twitter, this study aimed to retrieve relevant 
information and decide whether a Tweet expressed a positive or a negative opinion. 
They employed a deterministic approach and used linguistic knowledge to decide 
whether a tweet was positive or negative. Instances of positive-sentiment words and 
negative sentiment words were counted. In this study, a formula is presented to 
represent the day’s sentiment. This formula is the ratio of positive-sentiment words 
over negative-sentiment words. The study found that there was a strong correlation 




utilizes interesting methods to measure public opinion through Twitter, it does not 
look at the relationship between those sentiments expressed and election outcome. 
Furthermore, it is specifically focused on the United States election.  I conducted this 
study on a global scale and look at the outcome of the election, not just public 
sentiment. In countries where the election is fixed and there is a likelihood of fraud, 
public sentiment may be inclined against the incumbent. I look at nine different 
countries to find trends and relationships between sentiment on Twitter and the 
election outcome.  
Twitter prediction election has its criticisms as well. Gayo-Avello (2012) has 
a pessimistic view of election prediction using Twitter. He mentions several flaws of 
using Twitter as a means to make election predictions. He states that incumbency 
plays a large role in elections and that “chance is not a valid baseline”, that there is no 
robust way to count votes on Twitter, and variations of sentiment analysis do not 
yield a valid result (Gayo-Avella, 2012).  
 While incumbency plays a large role in elections, some of the countries to 
which I look at for this study do not have incumbents (Brazil, Colombia, and Egypt). 
Additionally, this study can show the degree to which incumbency influences the 
outcome of the election in different types of countries (countries classified as Free, 
“partly free”, and “not free”).  
In this study, I take the criticisms outlined above under consideration and do 
not aim to make predictions. However, I do aim to use previously utilized methods to 
conduct an exploratory study of global tweets and the role they play during elections 




“count” votes on twitter, number of mentions of a candidate, or hashtags associated 
with a candidate can express the sentiment of the tweeters and can ultimately aid in 
understanding the nature election in a particular country.   
Using sentiment analysis, automated analysis of tweets, analysis of networks 
of tweets, as well as keeping in mind abuses that occur in tweets (atroturphing, 
message dilution, and spamming), I aim to explore the relationship of the sentiment 
reflected in tweets and the election outcome as well as detect insightful trends from 
within the Twitter data. In this exploratory study, I aim to introduce new research 
designs, data collections methods and selection of subjects given the preliminary 


















Chapter 3: Methodology 
The methodology utilized in this study is multifaceted and consists of various 
methods of analysis of data. The results yielded from the methods below, which were 
part of my exploratory study, and allowed me to introduce new hypotheses and 
research designs for new areas of research.  
I collected tweets occurring before the general election of each of the nine 
countries outlined in Table 2 for a week prior to the respective election date. 
Analyzing the sentiment of the tweets toward the candidates as well as the graphical 
structure of the networks resulting from these tweets, I also looked at the frequency of 
links, hashtags and mentions in these tweets. A “hashtag” is defined as a tag 
embedded into a tweet on Twitter prefixed with a hash sign, “#”. Hashtags are used to 
organize topics around tweets. In this study, I explore two different types of 
mentions: (1) a mention is a when a Twitter handler user name embedded in a tweet is 
prefixed with the ampersand symbol, “@”, or (2) a mention is any mention of a 
candidate’s last name. For the second type of mention described above, for certain 
countries in which candidate last names were potentially ambiguous, both first and 
last names were queried.  
Textual analysis and graphical analysis as well as the metrics from Freedom 
House were used to compare the tweets generated for all of the elections. To compile 
a range of countries with differing freedom levels, I used the classifications presented 
by Freedom House (2012). I reviewed the tweets from the countries in Table 2 during 




election cycles, an initial and secondary round, I look at the election cycle that 
determines the winner. All of the government systems that are reviewed in this study 
are presidential.  
The Freedom House 
The freedom classifications in this study are based on the The Freedom in the 
World survey, an annual survey evaluates the status of global freedom. The 
classifications are according to two categories: civil liberties and political rights. The 
survey includes analytical reports and numerical ratings of 195 countries and 14 
select territories. The report also includes a summary for each country of the last 
years major developments. The ratings are based on checklist of 10 political rights 
questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The questions were rated by 59 analysts and 
20 senior-level academic advisors using a variety of information sources: academic 
analyses, foreign and domestic news reports, think tanks, nongovernmental 
organizations, individual professional contacts, and visits to the region. Based on 
these sources of information, each country is assigned a civil liberties and political 
rights score. These scores are averaged for each country to determine whether the 
country is “free”, “partly free” or “not free”. A country receiving an average rating 
between 1.0 -2.5 is considered “free”, an average score of 2.0 – 5.0 “partly free” and 
average score of 5.5-7.0, “not free” (The Freedom House).  
Freedom Classifications 
According to the Freedom House, a country can be classified as “Free”, 




House in its “Freedom in the World 2012” annual report. In this report, a “free” 
country is defined as a country “where there is open political competition, a climate 
of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent 
media.” A “partly free” country is defined as one “in which there is limited respect 
for political rights and civil liberties.” The freedom house concludes that “partly free” 
countries “suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and 
religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance 
despite a certain degree of pluralism.” Finally, a “not free” country is defined as “one 
where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and 
systematically denied.”  
The resulting metrics from the 2012 Annual Report were used as the primary 
Freedom House Classifications for this study. Additionally, the Freedom House offers 
a second set of classifications that scope the results of the research conducted in this 
study. Freedom House offers “internet freedom” scores. However, the Freedom 
House metric scores were most relevant to the research in this paper because go 
beyond just Internet freedom and encompass political climate and civil liberties, 
themes and topics reflected in the tweets in this study.  
Country Press Freedom Score Internet Freedom Score 
The United States Free Free 
Brazil Partly Free Free 
France Free N/A 
Colombia Partly Free N/A 
Venezuela Not Free  Partly Free 
Mexico Not Free Partly Free 
Egypt Partly Free Partly Free 
Iran Not Free Not Free 




Table	  1:	  2013	  Internet	  freedom	  scores	  by	  the	  Freedom	  House	  for	  each	  country	  in	  this	  study.	  
 
These particular metrics were taken into consideration as the study was 
conducted. Iran is the only country in this study with an Internet freedom status of 
“not-free.” This freedom status was reflected in the challenges I faced when 
collecting tweets that occurred during the Iranian election, as well as in the amount of 
content removed from links tweeted during the Iranian election.  
Determining which Countries to Analyze 
In order to ensure that countries were chosen that had potentially relevant 
tweets, I investigated election cycles that occurred after 2008. Barack Obama’s 
success in harnessing grassroots support through social media in the 2008 United 
States election is a milestone that marks the beginning of the utilization of social 
media by political campaigns globally. I stipulate that elections after this date are 
relevant (Rasmussen & Schoen, 2010). The two countries with the most Twitter users 
are the United States and Brazil (Evans, 2010). For this reason, the United States and 
Brazil are obvious choices for being representative of “free” countries to analyze in 
this study. The third country I selected to analyze, France, was chosen because it held 
a presidential election in the past year, and is additionally rated as one of top twenty 
countries worldwide with the most Twitter users (Evans, 2010). From the nine 
countries explored in this study, France’s 2012 election was also the only example of 
an election in which the incumbent lost the election. 
In order to select three “partly free” countries to explore for this study, I 
considered two criteria: twitter usage and type of political system. I selected 




all three of these countries are rated as one of top twenty countries worldwide with 
the most Twitter users. Some of the Twitter usage in these “partly free” countries 
rates even higher than twitter usage in some “free” countries (Evans, 2010).  
The most challenging part of the selection process was choosing countries 
classified as “not free” by the Freedom House. Countries that are classified as “not 
free” are classified as such because citizens do not have as many civil liberties or 
human rights as their “free” country counterparts. Lack of human rights often 
translates to limited access to information resources, like social media. Countries that 
had high Twitter usage (with respect to other “not free” countries) and had held 
presidential elections since 2008 were selected as “not free” countries for this study. 
As a result, Russia, Iran, and Egypt were selected. While some countries like Iran 
simply block content on social media, other countries like Russia have attempted to 
manipulate social media to their advantage by message dilution, discussed in the 
Chapter 2. The attempt by Russia to “hijack” hashtags shows that Twitter plays an 
influential role in Russian politics (Thomas et. al, 2012). For this reason, I chose 
Russia as a “not free” country to explore as a part of this study. I chose Egypt as 
another representative sample of a “not free” country because Twitter played an 
instrumental role in the 2011 Revolution and the “Arab Spring” as well as the most 
recent election in Egypt (Kavanaugh et. al, 2012). 
In Iran, the government blocks access to Twitter (Kavanaugh et. al 2012). 
Given this censorship, the candidates of such countries often avoid using social media 
mainly because the general public may not be able to access it. For example, I found 




in Iran is demonstrated by the usage of Twitter to spread news about protests in June 
2009 during the “Green Revolution”. Iran’s significant Twitter usage is also 
demonstrated by the fact that it is listed in the top twenty countries with the most 
Twitter users (Evans, 2010). Though the candidates in Iran don’t use Twitter, the 
people are very much involved, despite accessibility issues due to censorship (Burns, 
2009). For this reason, I chose to analyze Iran as one of the “not free” countries in 
this study.  
Data Collection 
Candidate tweets were collected for six months prior to the election date. 
General tweets in which the content mentioned candidate names were also collected 
from one week prior to the election. In order to accurately collect candidate tweets, I 
ensured that Twitter accounts that claimed to represent the candidate were “verified” 
by Twitter. Not all of the candidates in this study had “verified” twitter accounts. For 
example, none of the Iranian or Russian candidates had “verified” twitter accounts. 
For countries in which I do not have candidate twitter names, I focused my analysis 
on tweets six months prior to election by the general public. I have chosen countries 
and election cycles in which Twitter played a role so that in the event of insufficient 
candidate twitter data, tweets by the general public will be available for analysis.  
From the candidate twitter accounts, three lack the “verified” tag. These 
Twitter accounts belong to: Gabriel Quadric de la Torre of Mexico, Sergey Maroon of 
Russia, and Virgil Goode of the United States. All of these accounts contain 
information that imply that they belong to the their owners. Torre’s twitter account 




site has 81, 656 followers and also points to his official site http://mironov.ru. 
Goode’s account has 957 followers and links to his campaign website for the 2012 
presidential election http://goodeforpresident2012.com. Without the “verified” tag, 
however, it is difficult to be completely certain that these twitter accounts belong to 
whom they claim to belong. I kept in mind this uncertainty as I conducted the 
analysis. For all candidates who have a Twitter account, including the two un-verified 
twitter accounts, the Twitter Search API was used to collect tweets for six months 
prior to the election date.  
In order to analyze tweets made about candidates during the elections of each 
of these countries, I collected tweets from one week prior to elections that contained 
the names of any of the candidates from http://www.topsy.com. Topsy, a service that 
has access to Twitter’s stream of information, allows users to search tweets that 
occurred during the window of time indicated by the query. The smallest window of 
time allowed by Topsy is one hour. In order to maximize the number of tweets 
collected, queries were constructed for tweets that contained candidates’ names for 
every hour within one week prior to the election date. Candidate names were queried 
both in English as well as the native language of the country in which the election 
occurred.  
Twitter’s current API does not allow searching for old tweets. Ideally, tweets 
collected directly from Twitter would have yielded a more representative distribution 
of actual tweets during these election cycles. However, Topsy yields a representative 





To measure sentiment towards candidates, sentiment analysis was conducted 
on candidates that received more than 10% of the popular vote for each country. For 
the sentiment analysis of tweets, I opted for the Naïve Bayes Algorithm through the 
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK).  Naïve Bayes is an efficient and effective tool in 
language learning (Tumasjan et. al, 2012). To use this method, I trained the classifier 
to classify a tweet as either positive or negative towards each candidate. To 
accomplish this, users on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk rated 700-800 tweets and 
determined whether a tweet was positive or negative towards a candidate for the 
USA, France, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. The training set for Egypt, 
Iran and Russia were rated by Arabic, Farsi and Russian speakers respectively using 
the identical rating method employed by Amazon Mechanical Turk users. Each tweet 
on Mechanical Turk was rated three times as either very negative, negative, neutral, 
positive, and very positive. These ratings are associated with the scores -2, -1, 0, 1, 
and 2 respectively. The sentiment score of a tweets is the average of the three scores 
by Mechanical Turk users. Tweets in the training set with a score less than -.25 were 
classified as negative, tweets with a score between -.25 and .25 were classified as 
neutral, and tweets with a score greater than .25 was classified as positive.  
 I then provided this training set of pre-rated tweets to the classifier for each 
candidate in order to train the system. Using the classifier, I derived a sentiment 
classification of negative, neutral, or positive for each candidate. A total sentiment 
score was calculated towards each candidate by subtracting 1 from the score if the 




if a tweet was classified as neutral. This number was then divided by the total number 
of tweets to yield a sentiment score towards a particular candidate.  
 
Figure	  1:	  Example	  of	  Interface	  for	  rating	  sentiment	  towards	  candidate	  on	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  
Network Analysis 
I analyzed the network of tweets for the election cycle of each country. From 
the entire set of tweets collected, I derived a sample of 5000 tweets for each country 
in order to generate the network. I opted for Random Node Sampling because the 
Twitter API rate severely limits my options. Though Random Node Sampling does 
not retain power-law degree distribution, it is currently the best option for sampling 
for the data collected (Leskovec, 2006).  Current Topsy data contains only a screen 
name, tweet content, and an influence score. Three additional Twitter API calls need 
to be made for each user to obtain (1) their user id, (2) followers, and (3) friends. Due 
to time constraints, this would be an unreasonable amount of API calls for a network 




would yield better samples of the data, however, the number of API calls to sample 
10% of the total tweets by applying these approaches to any of the data I have 
collected would take too long to accomplish with the current Twitter API limitations.  
Additionally, I considered non-uniform Node Sampling as well as Edge 
Sampling. However, both Node Sampling and Edge Sampling require additional calls 
to the Twitter API and exhaust the number of calls that I have available per hour.  I 
also considered looking for nodes with the highest edge degrees in a particular 
network. However, such a method would require traversing the entire data set and 
making calls to the Twitter API for all of the data. For this reason, I have used 
random node sampling for my data. 
Clustering 
In order to detect communities, I clustered the sample networks using the 
Clauset-Newman-Moore algorithm. I analyzed Twitter profiles in each cluster to 
accurately classify communities in each network. I then classified clusters in each of 
the networks and calculated the overall influence score of certain clusters, particularly 
in countries in which other clusters’ tweets did not originate in the country being 
studied.  
Using network analysis, I attempted to identify key players in the network 
based on in-degree of nodes and betweenness centrality of nodes. The average degree, 
network diameter, average path length, number of shortest paths, density, modularity, 
number of weakly connected components, number of strongly connected components, 
average clustering coefficient, and number of communities were calculated for each 




Links, Mentions and Hashtags 
The set of tweets for each candidate, compiled over six months prior to the 
election date, were analyzed to extract a list of the most frequent links, hashtags and 
mentions for all of the tweets during a particular election. I aimed to see which 
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Table	  2:	  Countries,	  freedom	  status,	  political	  rights	  score,	  civil	  liberties	  score,	  candidates,	  candidate	  









Chapter 4: Findings 
In this chapter, I present my sentiment analysis results and classify 
communities within each network of the election tweets for all nine countries in this 
study. In order to conduct this exploratory research to determine the research design 
for hypotheses I conducted sentiment analysis of tweets, clustered the network of 
tweets to find communities, and extracted the top links, hashtags and mentions for 
each election cycle.  My methodology involves analyses that allow me to draw 
conclusions about the nature of each network. I chose sentiment analysis in order to 
understand how the tweeters for each of the elections felt towards each candidate. I 
clustered the network to detect communities within the network and to understand the 
structure of the network. And lastly, I looked at the top links, mentions and hashtags 
to gain an additional understanding to the sentiment analysis of the content of the 
tweets. These three methods yielded initial promising results that allow me to 
introduce hypotheses and research designs further discussed in Chapter 5.  
Sentiment Analysis 
Following the analysis of my results, I discovered that there is no relationship 
between the sentiment of a country towards the incumbent and its freedom status. 
Additionally I discovered that, regardless of a country’s freedom status, there is no 
correlation between the sentiment presented towards a candidate and the outcome of 
an election. 
For each of the countries in this study, the overall sentiment towards a 




or positive towards a particular candidate by Mechanical Turk users. These ratings 
were used as a training set to find the overall sentiment score towards a particular 
candidate. A score system was derived to reflect sentiment towards the top two 
contenders in every election cycle. Overall sentiment scores towards each candidate 
of the entire tweet set during the election cycle were calculated by adding one point to 
the score if the sentiment score of a tweet was positive, subtracting one point if the 
sentiment of a tweet was negative, and doing nothing (adding zero) if the sentiment of 
a tweet was neutral or irrelevant.  
Sentiment in “Free” Countries 
The sentiment expressed towards candidates in the “Free” countries in this 
study reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment score than the 
competing candidate. The tweets in the United States show a negative sentiment score 
for both candidates, with Barack Obama scoring a -.41, and Mitt Romney scoring a -
.26. Even though Barack Obama won the election, his sentiment score was lower than 
his competitor Mitt Romney. The top hashtags in the United States election provide a 
clue as to why Barack Obama’s score was lower than that of Mitt Romney (Table 13). 
The hashtag “#tcot”, standing for “Top Conservatives on Twitter” is the most used 
hashtag. In contrast, “#tlot” (Top Liberals on Twitter) appears lowest on the list of top 
hashtags.  
In France, Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent at the time of the election, received 
a higher sentiment score than François Hollande, the winner of the election. While 
both candidates received positive scores, Nicolas Sarkozy received a score of .15, 




of the election, scored a -.25, while Jose Serra, scored a .31. Even though the general 
sentiment towards Dilma Rousseff was negative, the election outcome did not reflect 
this score. Among the “free” countries in this study, all three countries (United States, 
Brazil, and France) reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment 
score than the loser of the election.  
Sentiment in “Partly Free” Countries 
While the sentiment scores in the “partly free” countries in this study did not 
consistently reflect the winner of the election, two of the countries, Colombia and 
Venezuela, demonstrated that the winner of the election had a higher sentiment score 
than the defeated candidate. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez scored a sentiment score of 
0.62, the highest candidate sentiment score in this study, while Henrique Capriles 
Radonski scored a 0.28. In Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos scored a -0.01, higher than 
the losing candidate, Antanas Mockus, who scored a -0.06. 
While the scores in these two countries might indicate that the sentiment in 
“partly free” countries accurately reflects the outcome of the elections, Mexico’s 
results reflected otherwise when Enrique Peña Nieto, the winner of the election, 
received the lowest sentiment score in all of Mexico’s presidential candidates. Nieto 
scored a -.12, compared to competing candidates Josefina Vazquez Mota and Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador, who scored a 0.09 and -.08 respectively.  
Sentiment in “Not Free” Countries 
Similar to the pattern observed in the “free” countries in this study, the 
sentiment score of the candidate who lost the election in “not free” countries was 




tweets during the election cycles in Russia, Egypt and Iran reflect that the candidate 
with the lower sentiment wins the election. In Egypt, the winner of the election, 
Mohammad Morsi, scored a -0.04 while his competitor, Ahmed Shafik, scored a 0.04. 
In Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent as well as the winner of the election, 
scored -.51. His competitor, Mir Hussein Mousavi, scored a 0.07. In Russia, Vladimir 
Putin, the winner of the election, scored -0.07 against Gennady Zyuganov, who 
scored a 0.08. In all three “not free” countries, the winner of the election received a 
lower sentiment score than that of the loser. A similar trend was observed for “free” 
countries. Based on these scores, it is impossible to correlate freedom and sentiment.  
The relationship between Incumbency and Sentiment 
The sentiment scores reflected that there is no relationship between 
incumbency, freedom status and sentiment. Out of the nine countries in this study, 
four held an incumbent at the time of the election: The United States, France, 
Venezuela, and Iran. Of the tweets belonging to these four countries, tweets from the 
United States and Iran reflected a negative sentiment towards the incumbents Obama 
and Ahmadinejad respectively. Venezuela and France’s tweets reflected a positive 
sentiment towards the incumbents Chavez and Sarkozy respectively.  The United 
States and Iran, as well as Venezuela and France, have different freedom statuses. 
Based on these scores, it is observed that there is no relationship between sentiment, 
incumbency and freedom status.  
Predicting Election Outcome based on Sentiment 
If election predictions were made solely on the sentiments conducted in this 




sentiment scores from the other election cycles reflected a more negative score for the 
winner of the election. The sentiment analysis of tweets in our study reflects simply 






Barack Obama -0.41 United 
States 
Free  
Mitt Romney -0.26 United 
States 
Free  
Dilma Roussef -0.25 Brazil Free 
Jose Serra 0.31 Brazil Free 
Nicolas Sarkozy 0.15 France Free 
François Hollande 0.00 France Free 
Hugo Chavez 0.62 Venezuela Partly Free 
Henrique Capriles 
Radonski 
0.28 Venezuela Partly Free 
Juan Manuel 
Santos 
-0.01 Colombia Partly Free 
Antanas Mockus -0.06 Colombia Partly Free 
Josefina Vazquez 
Mota 
0.09 Mexico Partly Free 
Enrique Peña Nieto -0.12 Mexico Partly Free 
Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador 
-0.08 Mexico Partly Free 
Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad 
-0.51 Iran Not Free 
Mir Hussein 
Mousavi 
0.07 Iran Not Free 
Mohammad Morsi -0.04 Egypt Not Free 
Ahmed Shafik 0.04 Egypt Not Free 
Vladimir Putin -0.06 Russia Not Free 
Gennady Zyuganov 0.08 Russia Not Free 
 
Table	  3:	  Sentiment	  scores	  for	  candidates	  
 
The results of the sentiment analysis conducted in this study did not yield a 
correlation between sentiment of overall tweets, freedom status of state, and election 




accurate sentiment score for tweets. The Topsy service was used in this study to 
collect tweets. Topsy only yields “influential” tweets in its queries. Such queries 
result in tweets whose writers are influential, meaning that that they have many 
followers. A large percentage of tweets collected belonged to established news outlets 
or organizations whose tweets do not reflect the opinion of a single individual. While 
tweets from organizations, especially political parties, are relevant for this study, it is 
difficult to calculate the sentiment score of a candidate when the tweets of 
organizations and news agencies are included in the overall scores.  
Network Characteristics 
In this section, I classify communities within a random sample of tweets for 
each of the election cycles from each of the nine countries in this study. I used the 
Clauset Newman Moore algorithm to cluster tweets to view visible communities 
within each of these sample networks (Clauset, 2004). In the networks shown below, 
communities were formed based on a variety of attributes. The communities in each 
of these networks reveal that there are classifiable groups within each country.  
Communities formed according the languages used to tweet, the tweet’s country of 
origin, or based on similar interests such as entertainment. Clustering tweets into 







Figure 2: Network of communities tweeting the week before Brazil’s election 
Five groups emerged from the tweets resulting from the Brazilian election. 
The two largest communities (“G1” and “G2”) consisted of journalists, bloggers and 
news agencies located in Brazil or specifically Sao Paulo. These communities tweeted 
primarily in Portuguese. A third group, “G3”, consists of Latin American news 
agencies, bloggers, or popular Twitter individuals tweeting in Spanish. The tweets in 
“G3” were primarily in Spanish and originated in various locations around South 
America including Mexico and Venezuela. “G4” consisted of Brazilian entertainers 
and individuals including comedians, adult entertainers, and students. These tweets 
were primarily in Portuguese. “G5”, also consisted of tweets in Portuguese, reported 
exit poll information. 40% of the tweets produced by profiles in “G5” reported exit 






Figure 3: Network of communities tweeting the week before Colombia’s election 
Colombia’s network can be grouped into two main communities. The first 
largest group, “G1”, consists of both candidates, Antanas Mockus and Juan Manuel 
Santos, media outlets, organizations, journalists, and the Official Green Party. The 
second group, “G2”, includes columnists, journalists and news agencies from other 
Latin American countries including Peru and Venezuela.  
 
Egypt 
Clustering the network of tweets from the Egyptian election yielded three 
significant groups. The largest group, “G1”, consisted of Arab media outlets and 




“G2”, also consisted primarily of media outlets, political activists, and political 
organizations, however the tweets were primarily in English and locations self-
reported within the profile were not located in Egypt. The third community of 
tweeters that emerged during the Egyptian Election cycle was a community of 
Egyptian individuals primarily tweeting in Arabic from within Egypt. The individuals 
in this group self reported that they were tweeting from locations within Egypt.  
 







Figure 5: Network of communities tweeting the week before France’s election 
France’s network consists of four main communities. The largest community, 
“G1” consists of Spanish media outlets reporting on the French election. Tweets from 
“G1” were primarily in Spanish. The second largest community, “G2” consists of 
French news agencies and journalists. “G3” consists of personal accounts tweeting 
from France. The tweets in this group were primarily in French. The majority of 
accounts in “G4” were personal accounts or journalist accounts. These individuals 







Iran’s network of tweets yielded nine groups from the Clauset Newman 
Moore algorithm (including a group of tweeters that were not connected to others in 
the network).  This group, placed on the upper left hand corner in the visualization is 
the largest group in the community. “G1”, the second largest group in this network, 
consists of media outlets and news figures such as: The Guardian, Ann Curry, and 
Anderson Cooper. For this study, these tweets were not significant because they did 
not represent the sentiment of Iranian citizens. One community, “G4” stood out as 
representing tweets from individuals in Iran. The profiles belonging to members of 
“G4” claimed that they live within Iran and tweeted primarily in Farsi. One individual 
within this group described himself as a “cyber citizen”. A sentiment score was 
calculated for this group specifically towards both the candidates, Ahmadinejad and 
Mousavi. Because a majority of the tweets from the Iran election did not originate in 
Iran, a new sentiment score was calculated only based on the tweets in “G4”. A score 
of -0.16 was calculated towards Ahmadinejad while a score of 0.24 was calculated 
towards Mousavi. These sentiment scores more accurately reflect the sentiment of 
Iranian tweeters than the sentiment represented in Table 3, because the sentiment 
score above took into consideration tweets from all of the other communities in the 






Figure 6: Network of communities tweeting the week before Iran’s election 
Mexico 
Three main groups emerged following clustering of the Mexican election 
tweets. The first group primarily consisted of news agencies, organizations, and 
journalists in Mexico. These tweets were primarily in Spanish. “G2” consisted of 
personal accounts and journalist accounts. These tweets were primarily in Spanish. 
“G3” consisted of personal accounts. “G4” consisted of personal accounts belonging 
















Figure 8: Network of communities tweeting the week before Russia’s election 
Russia’s sample network was clustered into seven classifiable communities. 
The largest group, “G1” consisted of Russian news agencies and popular individuals. 
The tweets in “G1” were primarily in Russian. The second group, “G2”, consisted of 
Russian news agencies like “Moscow Times” that tweeted primarily in English. The 
“G3” group tweeted both in English and Russian. This group’s profiles belong to 
individuals who self-report their locations as within Russia. A fourth group, “G4”, 
primarily consisted of individuals self reporting that they are tweeting from within 
Russia. The majority of tweets in “G4” were in Russian. “G5” contains tweeters that 
primarily tweet about exit poll information. These accounts are personal and tweets 




The United States of America 
 
Figure 9: Network of communities tweeting the week before the United States’ election 
The United States network in this study can be divided into four main groups. 
The largest group, “G1” consists of verified individuals, journalists, and media 
outlets. Individuals in this group include: Barack Obama, The While House, ABC 
World News, The New Yorker, ABC, USA Today, Huffington Post, and BBC World. 
The second group, “G2” consists of more conservative individuals such as Governor 
Mike Huckabee, Glenn Beck, and Fox News.  The “G3” group consists of primarily 
young tweeters who tweeted in support of Obama or against Romney. The fourth 
community of tweets primarily consisted of individuals tweeting in support of 





Five main communities emerged from clustering the Venezuela network 
tweets. The majority of tweets in groups “G1”, “G2”, “G3” and “G4” are in Spanish. 
Tweets in the group “G5” are in English. The groups “G1” and “G2” both consisted 
of journalists, individuals, and news media outlets that were located within 
Venezuela. The “G3” group consists of individuals and news agencies located in 
other Latin American Countries as well as other Spanish news agencies. The group 
“G4” consists of entertainers and younger individuals from Venezuela.  
 
Figure 10: Network of communities tweeting the week before Venezuela’s election 
Network Characteristics 
In this section I present the network characteristics of the nine countries in this 
study. For each network, I calculated the average degree, network diameter, shortest 




understanding the characteristics of each of the networks during the election cycles in 
the nine countries in this study.  I clustered each network using the Markov 
Clustering algorithm (MCL), which detects communities within a network based on 
simulation of stochastic flow (Markov, 2009). Table 4 shows the features of the 
networks including: average degree in the network, average weighted degree, network 
diameter, average path length, number of shortest paths, density of the network, 
modularity, number of communities (as detected by the MCL algorithm), number of 
weakly connected components, number of strongly connected components, and 
average clustering coefficient. 
Number of Communities 
The number of communities within each network varied. The country with the 
most amounts of communities, Brazil, is classified as a “free” country, and the 
country with the least amount of communities detected, Iran, is a not-free country.  
However, it is important to note that there is no clear correlation between the numbers 
of communities detected in the sample networks and freedom status of a country.  
Modularity 
A network with a high modularity indicates that the connections between 
Twitter users in a particular community are dense, but communities are not connected 
to one another. The three countries in this study with the highest modularity are the 
USA, Colombia, and Iran, which each hold different freedom statuses. The three 
countries in our study with the lowest modularity are France, Russia, and Egypt, 
which also hold different freedom statuses. There is no relationship between the 





I detected no relationship between connected components (either weakly or 
strongly connected) and freedom statuses of countries. Brazil and Mexico, a “free” 
country and “partly free” country respectively, had the most strongly connected 
components, while Iran and France, a “not free” country and a “free” country 
respectively, had the least amount of strongly connected components.  
Similarly, there was no relationship detected between weakly connected 
components and freedom status of countries. Iran, Egypt, and France were countries 
with the least weakly connected components. While Iran and Egypt are both countries 
classified as “not free”, France is classified as a “free” country. Brazil, Mexico and 
Russia, which have freedom statuses of Free, “partly free”, and “not free” 
respectively, have the most amount of weakly connected components.  
  France USA Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela Russia Egypt Iran 
Average 
Degree 




144.346 47.864 21.438 36.748 23.698 68.012 33.75 111.891 9.217 
Network 
Diameter 10 11 13 13 10 10 9 8 10 
Average Path 




3921645 3346718 4884393 2658275 3779554 5301416 482871 2288578 71437 
Density 0.011 0.015 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.018 0.008 
Modularity 0.302 0.435 0.382 0.539 0.292 0.391 0.274 0.255 0.472 
Number of 
Communities:  

















0.193 0.154 0.168 0.19 0.136 0.21 0.176 0.247 0.121 
Freedom 
Status Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free Not Free 
Table	  4:	  Network	  characteristics	  of	  the	  nine	  countries	  in	  this	  study.	  
 
Twitter Mentions, Links, and Hashtags 
In order to further understand the type of information tweeters were sharing, I 
extracted several key pieces of information from within tweets. I counted the number 
of times a candidate was mentioned by name (without the formal ampersand symbol 
“@” allowed by Twitter). Furthermore, I extracted the most frequent links, hashtags 
and “@” mentions by Twitter users. Hashtags reveal the topics discussed during the 
elections and mentions reveal to whom tweets are being addressed. Links also reveal 
the kind of topics discussed.  
Mentions of Candidate Names 
Tweets collected from Topsy were queried for all variations of candidate last 
names, including multiple ways of spelling as well as spelling with non-roman 
alphabet letters. Searching for all variations of a candidate name was particularly 
relevant for querying mentions of candidates in Egypt, Iran and Russia. 
Table 5 below shows the frequency of mentions for each candidate from the 
tweets that were collected. In all of the countries in this study, regardless of freedom 
status, the most frequently mentioned candidates won the election. The candidate 
names marked with an asterisk (*) below indicate that there are multiple spelling 












Dilma Rousseff  4,006 Brazil  
Josè Serra 53,177 Brazil 
Antanas Mockus  2,167 Colombia  
Juan Manuel Santos  3,535 Colombia  
Ahmed Shafik* 17,028 Egypt 
Muhammad Morsi* 17,249 Egypt 
Nicolas Sarkozy  26,575 France  
Françoise Hollande  27,915 France  
Mohsen Rezaee* 5 Iran 
Mehdi Karroubi* 47 Iran 
Mir Hussein Mousavi* 222 Iran 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad* 600 Iran 
Josefina Vazquez Mota 7,013 Mexico 
Enrique Peña Nieto 13,203 Mexico 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador 12,153 Mexico 
Gabrielle Quadri de la Torre 8,483 Mexico 
Gennady Zyuganov* 3,833 Russia 
Vladimir	  Putin*	   10,923	   Russia	  
Vladimir Zhirinovsky* 4,066 Russia 
Mikhail Prokhorov* 5,900 Russia 
Sergay Mironov* 3,001 Russia 
Gary Johnson 2,054 USA 
Virgil Goode  392 USA  
Jill Stein  2,842 USA  
Mitt Romney  39,759 USA  
Barack Obama  42,444 USA  
Henrique Capriles Radonski  20,450 Venezuela  
Hugo Chávez* 33,306 Venezuela 
 
Table	  5:	  Number	  of	  mentions	  for	  each	  candidate.	  
 
Twitter’s 140 character microblogging statuses allow for tagging other users 
using a “@” and using hashtags “#” to organize the topic of a particular tweet. For all 
of the tweets collected during the aforementioned election cycles, I searched for the 
most frequently mentioned profiles in tweets (using the “@” sign), the most frequent 
hashtags (marked with a “#” sign), and the most frequently shared links. Above, I 
reveal a table of results for each of the countries in this study. The analysis and 





Neither candidate Jose Serra nor Dilma Rousseff appears in the top mentions 
for Brazil. However, hashtags reflect support for the candidates. The top three 
hashtags “#voude13”, “13neles” and “#soumaisdilma” are pro-Dilma hashtags, the 
first two relating to the Worker’s party, the party to which Dilma Roussef belongs.  
Hashtags supporting Jose Serra also appear in the top ten most frequently tweeted 
hashtags: “#serra45” and “#serra”. The top tweeted link is a live blogging site for 
Dilma and Serra’s debate. Another link is for live tweeting about the candidates to 
TV personality, Bemvindo Sequeira. The significant role Twitter plays in Brazilian 
politics is reflected by the fact that there are multiple links encouraging live-tweeting 
in the top ten most shared links. These two links also reflect the degree of 
accessibility that Brazilians have to the Internet – so much so that they are able to live 
tweet about events as they happen.  This accessibility is a reflection of Brazil’s 
freedom status.  
Rank Link Mentions Hashtags 
1 http://migre.me/1RABx @el_pais #voude13 
2 http://bit.ly/br45il @ptnacional #13neles 
3 http://twitcam.com/2jrt2 @ConversaAfiada #soumaisdilma 
4 http://twitcast.me/_PAvg @sensacionalista #virada45 
5 http://bit.ly/bRim3R @Le_Figaro #euquero45 
6 http://t.co/y2UCgcX @g1eleicoes #serra45 
7 http://bit.ly/b5bdqE i @KeshaSuja #serra 
8 http://pud.im/eop @exilado #vaidarvirada 











While Juan Manuel Santos won the Colombian election, his name appears 
below Antanas Mockus’ name in the most frequently tagged profiles. Additionally, 
Santos’ name appears in top hashtags only below Mockus’ name. In the previous 
section I observed that Juan Manuel Santos was mentioned more than Antanas 
Mockus (without the “@” symbol.). The content shared on the top links varies. The 
content includes links to articles by various media outlets, a link to a Twitter picture, 
as well as a link to a Blog expressing joy about Santos’ victory over Antanas.  
Rank Link Mentions Hashtags 
1 http://bit.ly/a6euzV @globovision #Mockus 




4 http://bit.ly/9oysf6 @vladdo #Santos 




7 http://url.ie/6khy @JornalOGlobo #SoySemana 
8 http://bit.ly/aWXpCb @JuanManSantos #elecciones2010rcn 
9 http://tinyurl.com/2u8rtwk @ElUniversal #votebien 
10 http://tinyurl.com/35ddpn2 @caracolradio #WorldCup 
 
 
Table	  7:	  Top	  ten	  links,	  mentions,	  and	  hashtags	  for	  Columbia's	  election.	  
Egypt 
The top mentions in Egypt’s election cycle reveals that Youtube was a 
primary source of information during the elections. Among the “free” and “partly 
free” countries, all of the candidates are tagged directly in the top ten mentions. 
However, neither Mohammad Morsi nor Ahmed Shafik appear in the top ten tagged 
profiles, though “ikhwanweb” the official Twitter account for the Muslim 




of most frequently tagged profiles. The hashtag “#Shafik” is used more often than the 
hashtag for “#Morsi”. 
Four out of the five of the Twitter pictures shared in the top ten links are no 
longer accessible. Content that is no longer accessible represents a suspicious trend, 
one that is observed in the top links for Iran. The implications of this trend are further 
discussed in Chapter 5. Other top links include articles about the candidates from 
American news agencies and Arab news agencies.  
Rank Link Mentions Hashtags 
1 http://t.co/ZgCvJaaK @YouTube #Egypt 
2 http://t.co/KRoEPQgW @ahramonline #Shafik 
3 http://t.co/2wMc1L9K @guardian #Morsi 
4 http://t.co/IguCjaTs @Shorouk_News #Shafiq 
5 http://t.co/JuGvhuK1 @egyindependent #EgyElections 
6 http://t.co/h0a7loO9 @AlMasryAlYoum_A #tahrir 
7 http://t.co/KSTzfOMK @M_ibr #EgyPresElex 
8 http://t.co/Pa7FIFq1 @shadihamid #SCAF 
9 http://t.co/hALKAIg6 @ikhwanweb #jan25 
10 http://t.co/bDLi3soa @FRANCE24 #ikhwan 
 
 
Table	  8:	  Top	  ten	  links,	  mentions,	  and	  hashtags	  for	  Egypt's	  election.	  
 
France 
For France’s top mentions, I observed that Francoise Hollande, the winner of 
the election was tagged more than the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, who lost the 
election.  However, Sarkozy’s name appears in the top hashtags above Hollande’s 
name. Top links shared in France consist of news articles from French, US and 
Spanish media outlets as well as a twitter picture meme circulating regarding the 
incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy.  




Rank Links Mention Hashtag 
1 http://t.co/XEe7C439 @YouTube #Sarkozy 
2 http://t.co/sUqWLBtA @el_pais #Hollande 
3 http://t.co/7PWL2eYD @lemondefr #LePen 
4 http://t.co/fFk38k6m @fhollande #France2012 
5 http://t.co/L7u8rxoO @lesoir #Mélenchon 
6 http://t.co/nFrHzvCI @NicolasSarkozy #elysee2012 
7 http://t.co/aeVM5HLc @guardian #Francia 
8 http://t.co/FCEaencW @LeHuffPost #AvecHollande 
9 http://t.co/clsR9rla @Reuters #Résultats 
10 http://t.co/AjFVkOcA @2012resultats #FH2012 
 
Table	  9:	  Top	  ten	  links,	  mentions	  and	  hashtags	  for	  France's	  election.	  
Iran 
Out of the top ten most frequently tweeted links in the Iranian election cycle, 
three of them had been removed. The top ten mentions reveal that there is indeed 
twitter activity by one of the Iranian candidates or supporters of one of the Iranian 
candidates. The account “@mousavi1388” does not claim to represent Mir Hussein 
Mousavi. The bio reads, “MirHossein Mousavi is standing for election in the 
upcoming Iranian presidential election 2009. With Khatami, Vote Mousavi.” The last 
tweet from this profile was on February 20, 2011. While the candidates in this 
election did not have official Twitter pages, the top two names of candidates appear 
in the top ten hashtags (#Ahmadinejad and #Mousavi).  
Rank Link Mention Hashtags 
1 http://tinyurl.com/mko2q4 @add this #Iran 
2 http://www.alisanaei.com @can #fib 
3 http://friendfeed.com/vahid9 @RIA_Novosti #cnn 
4 http://iranvote.wordpress.com @Drudge_Report #tcot 
5 http://bit.ly/h9l3s @MelissaTweets #Ahmadinejad 
6 http://www.rfi.fr @maddow #iranelection 
7 http://tinyurl.com/n56yeh @TIME #elections 
8 http://tinyurl.com/oe8egw @bbcworld #election 
9 http://bit.ly/wao6z @andersoncooper #US 





Table	  10:	  Top	  ten	  links,	  mentions	  and	  hashtags	  in	  Iran’s	  election.	  
Mexico 
The winner of the election, Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN) is tagged most after 
Youtube. However the top two hashtags support Andres Manel Lopez Obrador 
(#panistasconAMLO and #HoyVotoPorAMLO). The third hashtag, “#yosoy132”, is 
part of a Mexican protest movement pushing for democratization against the winner 
of the election, Enrique Peña Nieto. Not only are the top tweeted hashtags supporting 
Obrador, the third most tweeted hashtag is a protest against the incumbent, Nieto. 
Even though Nieto’s sentiment score was less than all other competing candidates, he 
still succeeded in winning the election.  The top most shared link is a Facebook note 
regarding the flaws of the Mexican presidential system and the different political 
parties involved. This second most shared link is an article, titled, “25 Reasons Why 
to Vote for Josefina Vazquez”. The top links and hashtags are both anti-Nieto and 
despite this, Nieto still succeeded in winning the election.  
Rank Link Mentions Hashtag 
1 http://t.co/bFJdBIHk @YouTube #PanistasConAMLO 
2 http://t.co/G1mAhKNb @EPN #HoyVotoPorAMLO 
3 http://t.co/55SBbXxL @lopezobrador_ #Yosoy132 
4 http://t.co/hDMqSMqm @sharethis #ConfíoEnAMLO 
5 http://t.co/GBpKaKSw @sdpnoticias #MiVoto2012 
6 http://t.co/Sjcm2dOm @AMLO_si #LoLograsteJosefina 
7 http://t.co/ydztgIin @aristeguionline #AMLOGanaráPorque 
8 http://t.co/AvS7eCwV @LAURAZAPATAM #TodoMexicoEnElZocaloConAMLO 
9 http://t.co/IAD6rNJc @JosefinaVM #MañanaVotoPorElla 
10 http://t.co/gO2mPm4C @bernimarin #PreguntasExistenciales 
 






Among the most frequently tweeted links in Russia’s election, the content on 
the top two tweeted links listed below are no longer accessible. This is discussed in 
further detail in the Chapter 5. Furthermore, Youtube is a primary source of 
information appearing to be the top mentioned profile. The top hashtags include 
tweets in both Russian and English terms, the most frequently used hashtag being, 
“#4марта” or “March 4”, the date of the Russian election. The top mentions include 
media outlets and journalists.  
Rank Links Mention Hashtags 
1 http://t.co/J3oq6hkD @Youtube #4марта 
2 http://t.co/VNkYRNyl @rianru #Russia 
3 http://t.co/LXrmx8Mp @navalny #Putin 
4 http://t.co/1FIksyy5 @varlamov #novosti 
5 http://t.co/V8TFhZRx @YouTube #RT 




8 http://t.co/jHf4rmMh @naumovnk #FreelandFile 
9 http://t.co/Mw0Jnpdx @Dobrokhotov #Prokhorov 
10 http://t.co/5Tt64Mmj @Reuters #выборы 
 
Table	  12:	  Top	  ten	  links,	  mentions	  and	  hashtags	  for	  Russia's	  election.	  
The United States 
By exploring the top mentions that emerged during the election cycle in the 
United States, it becomes apparent that many users share content about the election 
using Youtube, the popular video sharing website. Furthermore, I observed that 
Barack Obama was tagged or mentioned more than twice as much as Mitt Romney 
was tagged. Top links included articles from The New York Times, Politico, Think 




Rank Link Mention Hashtag 
1 http://t.co/AVlagOjq @Youtube #tcot 
2 http://t.co/5xuHlwy4 @BarackObama #P2 
3 http://t.co/5yAMcolL @mittromney #OBAMA 
4 http://t.co/A5bH8d8V @cspanwj #Romney 
5 http://t.co/YMjYl84m @FiveThirtyEight #teaparty 
6 http://t.co/IkPBNvDy @SpikeLee #sandy 
7 http://t.co/Hw8LVFVB @Europe1 #GOP 
8 http://t.co/SfJlc1kw @GovGaryJohnson #tlot 
9 http://t.co/tvrI58B4 @AP #Benghazi 
10 http://t.co/cCHf29x3 @JillStein2012 #election2012 
 




In Venezuela’s top hashtags, “#Capriles” appears at the top of the most 
frequently used hashtags. Following “#Capriles”, “#HoyGanaChavez”, a pro-Chavez 
hashtag meaning “Chavez wins today” is the top hashtag. The most frequently shared 
link is an article reporting pictures from a pro-Chavez rally and is titled, “Vea Las 
Fotos De Las 7 Avenidas que Dejaron abierta a Capriles” which translates to, “See 
Pictures of the 7 Avenues that left Capriles’ mouth open”, referring to the magnitude 
of pro-Chavez protestors. The majority of the other top links shared are news articles 
from news agencies like the Wall Street Journal, Globovision, and CNN Español. 
One link frequently shared is a campaign twitter picture encouraging a global twitter 
“tuitazo” for Hugo Chavez. This particular link reveals that Venezuela’s government 
and Hugo Chavez’s campaign understand the potential influence Social Media and 
Twitter have on influencing public opinion. 
Rank Link Mentions Hashtags 
1 http://t.co/9UDtYCjj @chavezcandanga #Venezuela 
2 http://t.co/9UDtYCjj @hcapriles #Capriles 




Rank Link Mentions Hashtags 
4 http://t.co/ZEqdO0uw @abc_es #HayUnCamino 
5 http://t.co/vbsPqzd4 @TRIBUNA_PCV #eleccionesVenezuela 
6 http://t.co/zHBy9Ucw @Jan_Herzog #7O 
7 http://t.co/gVvBBhG7 @noticiaaldia #TuVoto 
8 http://t.co/7BQnFaxt @LucioQuincioC #Elecciones2012 
9 http://t.co/kqsQC2cq @tongorocho #Venezueladecide 
10 http://t.co/a7VBJSJJ @danielscioli #SeVeSeSabeMañanaSeVaChávez 
 






















































































Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 
In this study, I conducted an exploratory study of the relationship between a 
country's freedom and the Twitter activity during elections. I studied tweets occurring 
during elections in nine different countries: Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, France, Iran, 
Mexico, Russia, The United States, and Venezuela. I explored this space with 
automated analysis of the tweets' text, election outcomes, freedom ratings for the 
countries, and sentiment analysis. I found promising initial results regarding the 
relationship between the removal of links shared on Twitter during elections and the 
freedom status of a country, the relationship between the number of disconnected 
profiles in a network and the freedom status of a country, and the relationship 
between number of mentions of a candidate and election outcome. In this section, I 
have identified hypotheses for future work and research designs based on the initial 
results from this study. For each of the hypotheses presented, I establish a research 
design, method of data collections and method of selection of subjects. Furthermore, I 
present areas of research where there seems to be little indication of relationships.  
Sentiment Analysis and Election Prediction 
The sentiment analysis conducted in this study reveals that sentiment does not 
reflect the outcome of the election. If election outcome were based purely on the 
sentiment score derived in this study, only Colombia and Venezuela would yield 
correct election outcomes. The majority of the sentiment scores in this study do not 
accurately correlate with the outcome of the respective elections. In the beginning of 




election outcome with tweets (2012). He articulates that there is no commonly 
accepted way of counting votes on Twitter simply because not all tweets are 
trustworthy and Twitter is not representative of the entire demographic population. 
This trend was observed within the countries in this study. The tweets I collected 
from Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Russia, The United States, and 
Venezuela are simply not representative of the entire demographic of any of the nine 
countries with which we conducted sentiment analysis. Also, politically active 
individuals tend to tweet more, so self-selection bias is ignored. In this study, the top 
ten tweeters for each of the countries contributed to a significant portion of the total 
tweets for each of the elections. For example, tweets from the top ten tweeters in 
Colombia made 15.9% of the total tweets. The top ten tweeters in each of the 
countries in this study respectively make up less than 1% of the total profiles for each 
of these countries and yet they contribute significantly to the overall sentiment score. 
Thus the sentiment score is biased towards those who tweet more often. Election 
prediction using sentiment analysis prediction is not feasible, regardless of the 
freedom status of a country.  
Country	   Percentage	  of	  Total	  Topsy	  Tweets	  that	  are	  
produced	  by	  the	  top	  10	  Tweeters	  
USA	   4.08%	  
Brazil	   4.81%	  
France	   6.15%	  
Colombia	   15.9%	  
Venezuela	   6.21%	  
Mexico	   3.75%	  
Iran	   13.2%	  
Egypt	   10.19%	  




Table	  15:	  Percentage	  of	  total	  Topsy	  tweets	  for	  each	  country	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  the	  top	  ten	  
tweeters.	  
 Sentiment and Freedom 
I discovered that sentiment scores of candidates from almost all of the 
countries in this study were higher for the candidate that lost the election. Venezuela 
and Columbia were the only two exceptions to this pattern. I explored whether 
freedom and sentiment were related and aimed to see whether the freedom status of a 
country was related to the sentiment expressed towards the incumbent or towards a 
particular candidate. Only one of the three “not free” countries, Iran, had an 
incumbent for the election cycle in which we were studying. While Vladimir Putin 
was not an incumbent, he has previously held the presidential position in Russia and 
thus enjoys the same publicity and name recognition an incumbent would. Both the 
sentiment scores expressed towards Putin and Ahmadinejad were less than that of 
their competing candidates. However, this phenomenon cannot be conclusively 
attributed to Iran and Russia’s “not free” freedom status. While the incumbents or 
candidates/previously serving as presidents studied in the “not free” countries all had 
lower sentiment scores than the candidates with which they were competing, the 
results were mixed for “free” and “partly free” countries. The sentiment scores for 
incumbents in Mexico and Venezuela are higher than the candidates with which they 
were competing. The sentiment scores among the “free” countries demonstrated 
mixed results in regards to the relationship between incumbency and sentiment score. 
In the United States, Barack Obama’s sentiment score was less than that of Mitt 
Romney. In France, the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, received a higher sentiment 




the election. While tweets from both Russia and Iran reflect a negative sentiment 
towards the incumbent, the varying results of the “free” countries, especially the 
United States sentiment score reflecting a negative sentiment towards Barack Obama 
show that there is no relation between sentiment score towards an incumbent and the 
freedom status of a country.  
Hypotheses 
This research is an exploratory work that revealed several insights that could 
lead to future research. I found promising initial results with respect to the 
relationship between content removed from links during an election and freedom 
status of a country, the number of disconnected twitter profiles in the network 
structure of “not free” countries, and a strong correlation between the number of 
times a candidate name is mentioned and the election outcome.  Below, I present each 
hypothesis in detail along with a research design, providing evidence from my 
research.  
Hypothesis 1: Links shared on Twitter during elections of “Not Free” countries are 
more likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of “Free” 
countries.  
Because a Twitter status is limited to 140 characters, using a hyperlink in a 
tweet allows a user to share a large amount of information despite Twitter’s 
constraints. The content shared via hyper links is diverse. In my data set, hyperlinks 
are used to share blog posts, personal websites, Youtube videos and news articles. I 
studied the top ten most frequently shared links for each country in this study. Links 




of these news articles are certainly relevant, the content from user generated activity 
such as blog posts or a Youtube video uploaded by a user more accurately reflect how 
individuals feel about candidates. For this reason, the percentages below report the 
top ten links that did not include news articles by established news outlets. From the 
top ten most shared links among Iranian tweets (ignoring links from Western media 
outlets like Sunday Times and The Guardian), 70% of the content on these links had 
been removed. The content of these links varied. One site, http://alisanaie.com was 
completely inaccessible. A Youtube video was no longer accessible and had been 
removed by the user. Several blog posts had been removed and several sites were met 
with a 404 error. 
I also looked at the top ten links shared during the Egyptian election. Ignoring 
articles from established news outlets, the top ten shared links comprised of only five 
posts containing user-generated content. The user-generated content in the Egyptian 
election consisted of Internet memes/photos shared on Twitter. Four out of five of the 
top pictures shared are no longer accessible. While Egypt’s freedom classification has 
recently been promoted to “partly free”, it shared this common characteristic with the 
other “not free” countries in this study.  
In the tweets for the Russian election, the content of the two top links has been 
removed. These links were collectively shared hundreds of times, but are now no 
longer accessible. All three “not free” countries have top links that are no longer 
accessible or have been removed. In contrast, with the exception of live twitter stream 
links that are time dependent, the majority of top links were still visible and 




I stipulate that the content from links in “not free” countries are not accessible 
for two possible reasons. Fear of persecution may have driven a poster to voluntarily 
remove content posted on the web. A second possibility is coercion or being forced to 
remove content following persecution. During the Iranian election, the Iranian regime 
cracked down on Iranian bloggers and Internet activists. Similarly in Egypt, bloggers 
have been arrested for the content that they post (Booth, 2012). There have been no 
reports of Russian arrests related to Internet activity. This might be related to the fact 
that Russia had less links removed than that of its “Not-Free” country counterparts, 
Iran and Egypt.   
This exploratory study provided enough evidence to suggest the following 
hypothesis: links shared on Twitter during elections of “not free” countries are more 
likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of “free” countries. 
To prove this hypothesis, more tweets from countries with “not free” freedom 
statuses and presidential elections should be collected, studied and compared to 
tweets from “free” countries. Below, I outline a research design that would ultimately 
prove whether the hypothesis above is valid.  
Data 
The data required to conduct this experiment would involve tweets during 
elections of “not free” countries. While the Topsy service could be used to collect this 
data, a more representative distribution of tweets would result from collecting tweets 
directly from Twitter. However, since these tweets must be collected in real time and 
thus are difficult or even impossible to access for elections that have already 




To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from countries that 
previously have had presidential or parliamentary elections. Countries that fit these 
criteria include: Russia, Iran, China, Chad, Congo, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria. Similarly, tweets from election cycles of 
“free” countries should be collected during their respective presidential elections. 
Examples of “free” countries with adequate Twitter usage include: The United States, 
France, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany 
(Evans, 2010). 
Analysis 
To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the links resulting from 
tweets would be crawled to see if they have indeed been removed. Removed content 
presents itself in various ways. A broken or dead link results in the 404 or Not 
Found error message, which is a standard HTTP response code that indicates the web 
page is not accessible. However, a removed YouTube video, a removed blog post, or 
a removed twitter pictures will not yield a 404 error message. The host site will 
simply notify the user that the content has been removed. All possibilities must be 
considered when automatically detecting removed content from links. Once all links 
tweeted in “free” and “not free” countries are crawled, a conclusion can be derived as 
to whether content more often is removed from tweets following the elections in “not 
free” countries as compared to “free” countries.   
One challenge in such a study is that people in “not free” countries do not 
have equivalent access to social media like Twitter to people in “free” countries. This 




an election in the Congo for example would certainly be less than the amount of 
tweets resulting from the United States election. The samples of tweets collected must 
account for such inequalities.  
Significance of Study 
 This study is important in understanding if and why there is a correlation 
between a country’s freedom status and amount of content removed from links 
following an election. Fear of persecution or self-censorship may have driven a poster 
or author to voluntarily remove content posted on the web. An alternative cause for 
removal of content can be attributed to coercion or being forced to remove content 
following persecution. The outlined study above can explain why this phenomenon 
occurs. Upon discovering which links have been removed, the sources and authors of 
these links can be traced. Interviews can be conducted with the authors of links, 
posters of videos, or bloggers to learn about the reason of removal and whether the 
government played a role in the removal of content. This study would aid in 
understanding the relationship between governments, self-censorship, and tweeters in 
“not free” countries. 
Hypothesis 2: The Twitter networks of “Not Free” countries have more singletons, or 
disconnected profiles than “Free” countries.  
Using the Clauset Newman Moore Algorithm to cluster and visualize tweets 
for all of the countries in this study, I found that two of the “not free” countries (Iran 
and Russia) had a larger community of disconnected profiles than their “partly free” 
and “free” counter parts. The singletons in Iran’s network were part of the largest 




indeed a correlation between the network structure of tweets during elections and the 
respective freedom status of a country, then Egypt should also have had a very large 
group of singletons. However, Egypt presents a unique case in this study. The report 
in which this study is based on was published in 2012, prior to the Egyptian election, 
but after the Egyptian revolution. The most recent freedom classifications by the 
Freedom house classify Egypt as “Partly free”. While Egypt also has a large 
community of singletons in its sample network, it is not as large as Russia and Iran’s 
community of singletons. I consider that the events that occurred in 2012 have now 
altered the resulting freedom status in Egypt. Egypt was promoted to “partly free” in 
2013. However, its sample network still has a large community of singletons, but not 
as large with respect to the singletons in Iran and Russia. Based on these results, I 
hypothesize that “not free” countries have a large community of disconnected users 
tweeting about the election. Below, I describe data and analysis required to conduct 
an experiment to prove this hypothesis.   
Data 
The data required to conduct this experiment would be much like the data 
described for Hypothesis 1. This data could be retrieved from either Topsy or Twitter. 
While Topsy could be used to collect this data, tweets directly from Twitter would 
result in a more representative data set. However, as described above, these tweets are 
difficult to access and tweets from Topsy would be sufficient for such a study.  
To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from the election cycles in 
“not free” countries with presidential or parliamentary elections. In addition to Russia 




Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria. Similarly, tweets from 
election cycles of “free” countries should be collected during their respective 
presidential or parliamentary elections. These countries can include the countries 
mentioned in Hypothesis 1: The United States, France, and Brazil in addition to South 
Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany.  
Analysis 
In order to create a network of profiles that tweet during the election, the 
followers and friends of the tweeters must be accessed. While finding the connections 
between all the tweets collected would result in a more comprehensive network, the 
Twitter API limits access to Twitter, and given time and API constraints, such a task 
would not be plausible. As done in this study, random node sampling can be used to 
conjure a sample network. While other sampling methods like edge sampling, forest 
fire sampling and snowball sampling might yield a more connected network, the aim 
of this study is not to study a connected network, but to compare the number of 
singletons in each network. For this reason, the random node sample would be the 
best option for this study.  Once the sample network is constructed for all “free” and 
“not free” countries in the study, the number of singletons, or disconnected profiles 
can be counted and compared for all “free” and “not free” countries.  
Significance of Study 
This study outlined by the research design above is important because it 
attempts to understand if and why there are a higher number of disconnected profiles 
within networks for “not free” in comparison to networks for “free” countries. Upon 




profiles within the network to learn how often they tweet, if indeed they have friends 
and followers and to whom they are connected. Disconnected tweeters might stay 
disconnected in “not free” networks in order to stay anonymous to protect their 
safety. For example, some of the disconnected profiles in the Iran and Russia sample 
network did not have any tweets, despite tweeting in the past about the election. At 
some point, these Twitter users deleted their tweets. Such a study would prompt one 
to question why these tweeters opt to stay disconnected and anonymous and why 
have their tweets have been deleted. The number of friends and followers can be 
compared to the number of friends and followers of other tweeters in the network. 
Such a study could potentially lead to the detection of spammers who have a large 
amount of tweets but very few followers. The research outlined above could answer 
these questions and aid in understanding the networks of tweets in “not free” 
countries. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Number of mentions of a candidate’s name correlates with the election 
outcome.  
Predicting elections using Twitter has many flaws and criticisms, as addressed 
by Gayo-Avella (2012). However, Tumasjan et. al (2010) concluded in his study that 
looking at the number of mentions of a political party came close to traditional polls 
and is a plausible indication of voter shares. In this study, I looked at candidate name 
mentions. I did not look at political party mentions because not all of the countries in 
this study have official political party names. However, I looked at the number of 
mentions of each candidate and found that, except for Brazil, mentions of a candidate 




status. It is important to note that the winner of Brazil’s election was female and 
candidate names were only queried for last names. In elections, female candidates are 
more likely to be referred to by their first names than male candidates (Reeves, 2009). 
The data collected from Brazil revealed that “Dilma” was mentioned more than 
“Rousseff”, thus reflecting a degree of gender bias in referring to female candidates 
by their first names.  
 All of the countries reflected (except for Brazil) that the candidate with the 
most mentions wins the elections. Coupled with the sentiment analysis I conducted, 
these results show that when looking at tweets and the outcome of the election, it is 
not necessarily important what is being said about the candidate (many of the 
candidates had negative sentiment scores), but how many times a candidate is being 
mentioned. While it cannot be conclusively stated that the number of mentions of a 
candidate directly correlates with the outcome of an election globally, the results of 
this research indicate that such a hypothesis is indeed plausible. Below, I describe the 
data and analysis required to prove such a hypothesis on a global scale. 
Data 
For this particular study, Topsy data would not be sufficient. The data needs 
to be representative of all tweets during an election and not just the “influential” 
tweets resulted from Topsy queries. While tweets resulting from queries from the 
Topsy service are sufficient for some studies, a study that looks at the raw number of 
mentions requires data that is representative of all the tweets and thus needs to be 
collected directly from the source.  To prove that the number of mentions correlates 




several countries. Even though this data is difficult to access because of Twitter API 
limitations, a selection of 10-20 countries would be sufficient for this study.  
Analysis 
To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the tweets need to be 
searched for mentions of the names of candidates and political party names. Mentions 
can include a reference to the candidate name or a direct tag using the ampersand 
symbol (@) if the candidate has a verified Twitter account. Different spelling 
variations of candidate names must be considered when searching for mentions of 
candidate names in different countries. Mentions through hashtags should be 
considered as well for such a study. Often, during elections hashtags in support of a 
particular candidate are shared. For example, in Brazil’s election, the hashtags 
“#voude13” and “#13neles” do not mention Dilma Rousseff’s name, but they are 
supporting her and the party to which she belongs. An automated method of detecting 
which hashtags support which candidates can count the number of hashtags in support 
of a candidate. For example, a tweet in favor of a particular candidate will most likely 
use hashtags in support of that candidate. Taking this into consideration would allow 
a researcher to draw a connection between an obvious hashtag in support of a 
candidate and one that is not so obvious. For example the hashtags “#soumaisdilma” 
is in obvious support of the candidate and includes the name of the candidate within 
the hashtag. If  “#soumaisdilma”, “#voude13” and “13neles” are all used in the same 
tweet, it can be deduced that “#voude13” and “13neles” are in favor of Dilma 
Roussef, the presidential candidate for the Brazilian election.  These hashtags should 




“mentions” should be redefined to include hashtags, direct tags (@) of political 
candidates as well as mentions. Upon conducting this search, the number of mentions 
for each candidate should be compared to voter shares to see how closely it correlates 
with the outcome of the election.  
Significance of Study 
While the research design above is not attempting to predict the election 
outcome based on the number of mentions of a candidate, it can demonstrate whether 
the number and type of mentions of a candidate correlates with election outcome 
globally. Furthermore, if such a correlation is discovered for all of the countries 
studied, types of mentions and their relationship with the outcome of the election can 
be more clearly defined. For example, in this study it was observed that in some 
countries, the winner of the election was tagged directly using the ampersand symbol 
(@), while in other countries, the winner of the election was not tagged directly but 
had multiple top hashtags in support of her/him. While I found that there is no 
relationship between sentiment expressed towards a candidate and election outcome, 
the initial results showed that number of mentions correlated with election outcome 
regardless of freedom status. In addition to mentions by name, number of hashtags 
(#), and direct tags (@) can be counted and compared to see the way in which users 
communicate about a political party or candidates and how the method of mentioning 
a candidate is related to the outcome of the election.  This research would aid in 
understanding the relationship between different forms of referencing political parties 
and candidates on Twitter (tags, hashtags, and mentions) and the outcome of the 





Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
	  
In this study, I explored the Twitter activity during nine election cycles within 
countries with nine different freedom statuses. In this study, I found promising initial 
results showing that tweets from “not free” countries are more likely to have content 
removed from links that are shared from the web, networks of tweets occurring 
during elections of “not free” countries have more disconnected profiles and that 
there is a strong relationship between election outcome and number of mentions of a 
candidate. Based on my results, I presented three hypotheses with a research design 
that can be pursued in future work. My results also show that the sentiment expressed 
towards a candidate by tweeters during an election cycle does not indicate who will 
win the election and that the sentiment expressed towards an incumbent does not 
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